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Abstract
Climate change now constitutes a major issue in world politics, intersecting with 
and shaping many other political domains, and wider patterns of social and eco-
nomic life. Global climate governance is also  no longer restricted to multilateral 
negotiations under the UN Climate Convention: it increasingly extends beyond the 
international climate regime to climatize other areas of global politics. This concept 
of climatization points to a powerful but uneven process of extension, translation, 
and social coordination, as climate change becomes the frame of reference through 
which other policy issues and forms of global activism are mediated and hier-
archized. This special issue brings together contributions on both theoretical aspects 
and empirical cases of the climatization process. The introduction sets out a concep-
tual framework to systematize these observations and guide further research. First, 
we identify the preconditions for, and driving forces behind, climatization. We then 
sketch the contours of an emergent ‘climate logic’ that reshapes affected domains, 
and examine the wider implications of climatization for global politics. Beyond the 
climate case, we hope this will provide new ways to observe and understand con-
temporary transformations of global society and global governance.
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Introduction
Climate change now constitutes a major issue in world  politics, intersecting with 
and shaping many other political domains, and profoundly affecting wider patterns 
of social and economic life (Dalby 2016; Vogler 2016). Consequently, global cli-
mate governance has become the focal point for a wide array of debates and con-
flicts around issues from development and global equity to energy policy, urban 
planning, security and migration. The annual conferences of the parties (COPs) held 
under the auspices of the United Nations climate convention (UNFCCC) are thus 
not only key moments in global climate politics, but also events of wider geopoliti-
cal significance. They attract ever more public attention and an increasingly diverse 
set of actors, while creating political momentum for climate-related issues beyond 
the climate arena (Kolleck et al. 2017). Climate governance actors and mechanisms 
thereby extend their sphere of influence by ‘climatizing’ other domains of global 
politics (Aykut et al. 2017).
The concept of climatization points to a powerful yet uneven social process in 
which climate change is increasingly becoming the frame of reference for the media-
tion and hierarchization of other global issues. This does not only, or even primar-
ily, result from legal dispositions in climate treaties or formalized linkages between 
international organizations (van Asselt et al. 2005). Instead, it is often brought about 
by the work of a myriad of actors and organizations engaging in climate-related 
activism, building transnational networks, or refracting their issues and objects 
through a climate lens. These actors may enter the climate arena to lobby for the 
inclusion of their concerns in climate talks, or to gain access to the symbolic and 
economic capital associated with the climate regime. They may be driven to include 
climate concerns in their traditional mandate by political and normative convictions, 
or on pragmatic or strategic  grounds. To encompass this wide array of situations 
and motives, we define climatization broadly as the process through which an issue, 
actor or institution is framed as related to anthropogenic climate change and rel-
evant to climate politics. More specifically, this frequently leads to the extension of 
the jurisdiction of climate governance institutions, the inclusion of the climatized 
issues, actors or institutions in climate policy networks, and their treatment accord-
ing to the dominant logics of the international climate regime.1
This special issue examines the process through which climate change is trans-
forming global governance, as both an increasingly central issue on the international 
stage and an increasingly structured policy domain with its specific modes of gov-
erning, networks of actors, discourses, and knowledge practices. Collectively, the 
contributions aim to assess how and why climate change is becoming a dominant 
frame in international politics. In doing so, they also contribute to understanding the 
dynamics and drivers of climatization. Speaking to climate governance scholars and 
researchers in other areas of global politics, it addresses what, in our view, are two 
major blind spots in the literature. First, existing work on global climate governance 
1 This can be conceptualized as a sectorial expansion or ‘globalization’ of the climate problem (Foyer 
et al. 2017: 5).
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has argued that a central objective of this governance since the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement in 2015  has been to ‘facilitate’ (Hale 2016) global climate action and 
‘orchestrate’ (Abbott 2018) a wider ‘polycentric’ landscape of transnational govern-
ance initiatives (Jordan et al. 2018). However, this literature ultimately has little to 
say on exactly how, where, and why such functionalist desiderata of social coor-
dination might actually manifest in practice.2 What social logics and mechanisms 
are involved? We believe that a focus on climatization as a social process can pro-
vide important insights here, by offering a perspective on decentralized coordina-
tion around the climate problem that complements functionalist accounts. Second, 
an important body of work has examined the political agenda-setting processes 
through which climate change became a politically relevant topic, and the framing 
contests in its construction as a (global) public problem (Hajer 1995; Trumbo 1996; 
Pettenger 2007). Scholars have assessed the role of wider political dynamics in the 
(de)politicization of climate change, and how broader discursive frames have shaped 
global climate governance (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016). Building on this lit-
erature, the articles gathered in this special issue further explore these framing pro-
cesses and their implications beyond climate politics as such. In other words, while 
previous work has mostly considered what politics is doing to climate change, this 
special issue examines what climate change is doing to (global) politics.
To do this, we believe that a wider focus is needed in terms of actors, arenas, and 
climate-related practices, as well as a more fine-grained understanding of the discur-
sive and symbolic dimensions of global (climate) politics. We approach climate gov-
ernance as a multi-actor, trans-scalar and nonlinear process of social coordination—
enacted through diplomatic practices and performances (Schüssler et  al. 2014), in 
networked relations between state and non-state actors (Bernstein et al. 2010; Betsill 
and Bulkeley 2004), and through global discourses with normalizing effects on the 
everyday (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Paterson and Stripple 2010). This per-
spective foregrounds processes, practices, and discourses (rather than just regimes, 
international organizations, and legal rules). It examines the diversity of actors and 
scales involved (rather than just states and international negotiations). And it treats 
the boundaries of climate governance not as fixed, but as constantly negotiated and 
enacted by the actors involved. Combining perspectives rooted in international rela-
tions, international political sociology, political geography, political ethnography, 
and science and technology studies, the special issue seeks to contribute to building 
a stronger theoretical framework to study the extension of the climate realm and the 
resulting implications for global politics.
The articles in this issue make three main contributions to that project. First, they 
help to further characterize and specify the process of climatization. Focusing on a 
wide variety of actors, issue areas, and governance scales, they display the diversity 
of motivations and strategies that drive the climatization process, but also bring out 
2 Van Asselt and Zelli (2018: 36), for instance, note that ‘whether and for how long the UNFCCC—the 
COP or the secretariat—has been an orchestrator is an open question’, and go on to argue that while ‘the 
international regime has exerted at least some influence’ on transnational climate governance, it remains 
unclear ‘how much’ and ‘through precisely what causal mechanisms’ this may have happened.
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shared patterns and mechanisms. One set of papers investigates the role and modes 
of coordination of non-state actors, with a focus on the climate justice movement 
(de Moor 2020), transnational indigenous grassroots movements (Dupuits 2020), 
and philanthropic foundations (Morena 2020). These studies show how civil soci-
ety actors enter the climate arena by establishing transnational networks, how they 
reformulate their political aims and interests by relating them to climate concerns, 
and how they attempt, with variable success, to shape climate governance debates. 
Looking at these actors and their mobilizations and framings also sheds further light 
on the origins of some of the main characteristics of the Paris climate regime. These 
characteristics are further spelled out in Aykut et  al. (2020) analysis of post-Paris 
climate politics. The authors show that symbolic elements and communicative tech-
niques are central features of the new governance approach. Estève (2020) Jayaram 
(2020) supplement this panoramic overview of actors and policy arenas by focusing, 
respectively, on the French and Indian armed forces. They identify the drivers and 
mechanisms pushing for the climatization of the military in both countries, while 
also pointing to the very selective ways in which military actors frame and address 
climate change. Finally, Maertens (2021) examines the confrontation of another 
important international organization, the UN Security Council, with the power of 
attraction of the climate topic, and characterizes the overlapping dynamics through 
which the Security Council is progressively being climatized.
Second, the articles reveal the ambiguities, frictions and resistances that accom-
pany both the diffusion of climate change into other global arenas and the incorpo-
ration of new issues into climate governance. Dupuits (2020) shows that climatiza-
tion can be reversed when the outcomes of climatizing strategies do not meet the 
expectations of their initiators. In this case, a transnational grassroots network—the 
Mesoamerican Alliance of Peoples and Forests—pulled out of climate negotiations 
when it became clear that they would not be able to advance their agenda on territo-
rial security within the UNFCCC. De Moor (2020) highlights resistances to clima-
tization, which occur when a climate framing tends to homogenize very different 
grievances, complicating activists’ efforts to define an alternative ‘globality’. Simi-
larly, Maertens (2021) shows that the UN Security Council cannot escape climate 
discussions despite fierce resistance by some member states. Frictions also appear in 
Estève’s (2020) account of framing contests over the links between climate change 
and insecurity, which involve strategies of climatization, securitization, and riski-
fication. Jayaram (2020) shows that—partly as a result of such differences in strat-
egies—climatization can come in different forms and degrees, often appearing as 
purely symbolic or strategic, and less often as precautionary or even transforma-
tive. This kind of focus on symbolic action and communicative strategies can also 
be found at the very heart of global climate governance, with its ‘performative’ 
approach to global climate action (Aykut et al. 2020). Taken together, the contribu-
tions provide new conceptual resources to capture the current remodelling of world 
politics by climate change, drawing out the implications of climatization as a domi-
nant framing and highlighting forms of resistance to it.
Third, the papers link climatization processes to broader global trends and 
issues. On the one hand, they draw attention to the multiple ways in which differ-
ent domains of global politics connect, interact, and influence each other. The three 
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studies on the intersection between the fields of security and climate change, for 
example, demonstrate the need to go beyond an exclusive focus on the ‘securitiza-
tion’ of climate change (McDonald 2013), using climatization as an alternative or 
complementary way of theorizing these interactions (Estève 2020, Jayaram 2020, 
Maertens 2021). On the other hand, the climatization lens also provides new ways 
to reflect on shifts in global power relations with the rise of soft (Abbott and Snidal 
2000), private (Hall and Biersteker 2002), and hybrid (Andonova 2010; Graz 2006) 
forms of global governance. Morena (2020) shows that US philanthropic founda-
tions played a key role in shaping the bottom-up, soft law approach of the Paris 
climate regime. Aykut et  al. (2020) examine how the focus on private action and 
the importation of management tools into global governance changes how interna-
tional agreements are implemented. Non-state actors are also central in de Moor’s 
(2020) analysis of attempts by the climate justice movement to establish a global 
space of mobilization and conflict. More broadly, the articles seek to reflect on the 
central position of climate change in global politics without simply reproducing it. 
Instead, they shed new light on issues of power and domination resulting from une-
qual access to global arenas and governance scales. In doing so they contribute to a 
deeper understanding of current transformations not only of climate governance, but 
also of global politics more broadly.
In the light of the insights provided by the studies in this issue, we develop six 
theses: (1) Climatization is a process, not an end state; (2) Climatization is afforded 
by problem characteristics and rooted in past governance failures; (3) Climatization 
operates not only through strategic moves, but through a wide variety of practices; 
(4) Climatization is driven by motives of problem control, adaptation to change, and 
institutional expansion; (5) Domains affected by climatization reveal a climate logic 
in the making; (6) Climatization reveals, reproduces, and rearticulates power rela-
tions. In the conclusion, we advocate for further research on climatization and its 
interaction with other contemporary transformations of global governance.
(1) Climatization is a process, not an end state
Social science scholars have coined various terms which use the suffix ‘-ization’ 
to draw attention to broad historical dynamics in which one social sphere becomes 
a dominant force of transformation in other spheres: ‘judicialization’ points to the 
increasing ‘reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral pre-
dicaments, public policy questions, and political controversies’ (Hirschl 2008: 
253); ‘financialization’ to the ‘increasing role of financial motives, financial mar-
kets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies’ (Epstein 2005: 3); and ‘medicalization’ to the numerous 
‘processes through which more and more social issues become framed as medical 
problems and are responded to through medical frameworks’ (Elbe 2010: 15).
Conceiving climatization in such processual terms presents two decisive advan-
tages over other notions, such as ‘climate mainstreaming’ or ‘greenwashing’. First, 
the analytical focus is immediately placed on ongoing changes. The articles in this 
special issue take an interest in the perpetual renegotiations of the boundaries of 
the climate realm. Instead of assuming a fixed delimitation of climate politics, they 
empirically assess its expansion (and sometimes its shrinkage) in specific contexts. 
This echoes debates among securitization scholars, where the Copenhagen School’s 
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fixed definition limiting the domain of ‘security’ to exceptional measures has been 
challenged (Trombetta 2008: 591). By analogy with this literature, we see clima-
tization as unfolding through climatizing moves, understood as attempts to impose 
a climate frame on another object or issue and/or subject it to climate governance 
practices. Climatization, in this sense, is ‘an always (situated and iterative) process 
of generating meaning’ (Stritzel 2007: 366), which simultaneously affects both the 
climatized object and the climate problem itself. A focus on climatization hence 
helps us to recognize unstable (and even reversible) developments. Climatization in 
this sense is not an end state reached through past changes, but an ongoing process 
of transformation.
Second, the concept of climatization does not specify the form and intensity of 
such shifts, or the motivations behind them. It is broad enough to encompass superfi-
cial and largely symbolic changes as well as much deeper transformations. It neither 
presupposes specific intentions, like the concept of greenwashing, nor does it limit 
the focus to the strategic dissemination of policy frames, like the concept of climate 
mainstreaming (Methmann 2010). It covers observable transformations in both dis-
courses and practices. Furthermore, we do not assume that climatization is in itself 
essentially good or bad. This contrasts with strands in securitization studies where 
scholars express normative concerns vis-à-vis securitizing moves. These authors 
draw attention to the risks of militarization, the reliance on undemocratic decision-
making procedures, the (potentially unintended) consequences in terms of discrimi-
nation, and more broadly ‘the signifying work’ of the word ‘security’ (Huysmans 
1998: 226). In her study of the securitization of the environment, Floyd challenges 
the normative assumptions underlying such warnings, suggesting that ‘not all secu-
ritisations are morally equal’ (Floyd 2010: 56). Likewise, our starting point in this 
special issue is that climatizing moves may respond to very different normative con-
siderations, and that their effects should be assessed empirically, without presuming 
specific outcomes, positive or negative. Such normative (and analytical) openness, 
we believe, is needed to ensure the heuristic value of the concept of climatization 
and its ability to shed light on contemporary transformations in global politics.
(2) Climatization is afforded by problem characteristics and rooted in past 
governance failures
If climatization is a process, then what are its origins? Are there features of the 
climate problem that predispose it to expand, or explain its force of attraction? 
We believe that the answer to these questions lies in how climate change has been 
constructed as a scientific object and as a public problem. Climatization draws on, 
or is afforded by, scientific notions of the interconnectedness of the climate sys-
tem and the transversal nature of the climate problem. To understand the climate, 
scientists need to take into account a potentially infinite set of other elements and 
processes, from water and carbon cycles to oceanic currents, ocean–atmosphere 
interactions, and ecosystem dynamics (Edwards 2010). Climate policy, too, is 
complex in its thematic scope, linking up to other policy domains and societal 
spheres. To really fight climate change and adapt to a warming climate, we may 
have to transform quite literally ‘everything’ (Klein 2014), from everyday habits 
and mobility practices to energy systems and management routines, as well as 
the regulation of global energy markets, trade, and finance. In other words, core 
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features of the climate problem and its social construction mean that its manifes-
tations are ubiquitous across world society (Aykut 2020).
The climatization process is also rooted in past governance failures, which 
have exacerbated the urgency and increased the magnitude of the necessary 
changes. Past governance decisions did not prevent, halt, or even slow danger-
ous global warming. As a result, more and more aspects of global society are 
affected by the consequences, and decarbonization scenarios imply ever more 
drastic changes in global economic and social practices (Ripple et al. 2019). The 
contributions to this special issue show that climate change has direct effects on 
everyday practices and administrative routines in multiple domains (Estève 2020; 
Jayaram 2020; Maertens 2021), while affecting social movements and mobili-
zations (de Moor 2020; Dupuits 2020). Mainstreaming climate concerns in all 
sectors therefore increasingly appears as the only viable strategy to avoid major 
disruptions after more than 30  years of international negotiations with utterly 
insufficient outcomes (Moncel and van Asselt 2012; Hale 2016). And yet clima-
tization is no panacea: it may well reproduce the same institutional mechanisms 
that have thus far failed to prevent dangerous climate change.
(3) Climatization operates not only through strategic moves, but through a 
wide variety of practices
The contributions to this special issue show that climatization is not necessar-
ily intentional or strategic. It unfolds through a large variety of practices, under-
stood here as socially meaningful patterns of action (Adler and Pouliot 2011). 
Each of the articles relies on different methodological tools to trace and analyse 
these practices, which range from everyday social routines to forms of administra-
tive action and policy-making. As such, many of these practices are not climate-
specific. Agenda-setting, lobbying, and the production of expertise, to name just 
a few, are a common feature across political domains. But taken together, the arti-
cles display a set of concrete ways in which actors turn a climate lens on an issue 
(Dupuits 2020; Maertens 2021), extend the realm of climate politics (Aykut et al. 
2020; de Moor 2020), and integrate climate change considerations into other pol-
icy domains (Estève 2020; Jayaram 2020). Below, we distil a list of climatization 
practices from the different case studies (Table 1). We group them into catego-
ries: framing and communication; policymaking and governance; networking and 
mobilization; documenting and research; and financing and implementation. This 
list may, we hope, be expanded and refined by future research. By surveying the 
different ways in which climatization occurs empirically, it shows that to under-
stand what climate change is ‘doing to’ (global) politics, we should pay close 
attention to such everyday practices and routines. It also stresses that despite the 
magnitude and urgency of the climate emergency, the transformation of global 
politics is not necessarily sudden or disruptive. Climatization also foregrounds 
various more incremental changes that, in combination, may deeply and durably 
transform the governance of global problems. Practice tracing methods (Pouliot 
2014) and other qualitative research strategies, including participant observation 
and ethnographic methods (Campbell et  al. 2014), are often needed to uncover 
the concrete ways in which climatization unfolds and affects global governance.
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(4) Climatization is driven by motives of problem control, adaptation to 
change, and institutional expansion
The practices listed above respond to three broad motives. While these may often 
overlap in concrete empirical cases, distinguishing them helps to identify the main 
driving forces behind climatization. A motive of problem control underlies attempts 
to (re)define the problem and mitigate it by designing appropriate policy responses. 
It drives practices of agenda-setting in international organizations (Maertens 2021). 
It supports the negotiation and formulation of climate policy objectives, the main-
streaming of such objectives across governance arenas and levels, their translation 
into policy instruments, and their implementation in administrations and businesses. 
Post-Paris climate governance actively supports climatization in this sense through 
its polycentric and facilitative approach, which relies on communicative tools to 
spread climate concerns among private and public actors (Aykut et  al. 2020). A 
motive of problem control also drives networking and agenda-setting activities by 
philanthropies and NGOs aimed at promoting new approaches in global climate 
governance (Morena 2020), as well as practices of issue-linking and campaigning by 
social movements striving to advance alternative problem frames (de Moor 2020).
Table 1  Climatization Practices
Framing and Communication Campaigning with climate arguments
Climate-related reporting and storytelling
Establishing responsibility in the climate crisis
Linking climate change with other issues
Climate-centred agenda-setting
Policymaking and Governance Adopting climate policy measures
Building climate task forces and organizations
Climate-related lobbying
Negotiating climate governance goals and treaties
Networking and Mobilization Advocating for technical solutions
Demonstrating for climate action
Engaging in direct action against polluters or infrastructures
Including climate actors in other policy arenas
Sustaining climate networks and initiatives
Documenting and Research Carbon disclosure and reporting
Circulating and publicizing climate expertise
Climate-related forecasting
Creating metrics and standards to monitor climate action
Producing climate risk analyses
Financing and Implementation Climate proofing
Disaster intervention
Funding climate advocacy networks and think tanks
Setting up and supporting adaptation/mitigation projects
Strategic planning in public and private organizations
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A motive of adaptation to change is found in responses and strategies used to 
cope with and react to a changing environment. This can be seen, for example, in 
practices that local communities and administrations use in building adaptive capac-
ities to respond to a warming climate, and in businesses’ reactions to changes in 
market environments brought by climate policy interventions. The climate prob-
lem is increasingly becoming an inescapable reality for indigenous peoples who are 
directly affected by adaptation policies aiming either to restore strict conservation 
policies or to establish market-based conservation mechanisms (Dupuits 2020). This 
is also true for non-climate oriented international organizations, which are required 
to address climate change in their policy and programming (Hall 2015; Maertens 
2021), and military organizations which are directed to integrate warming impacts 
into their strategic planning (Estève 2020; Jayaram 2020). In these cases, climatiza-
tion is motivated by self-preservation in the face of warming impacts, or resistance 
to climate-related transformations and policies, and aims at building long-term resil-
ience or ensuring institutional and organizational continuity in a changing world.
Finally, a motive of institutional expansion structures endeavours to use the cli-
mate topic to increase an organization’s public profile, attract political or media 
attention, or tap into climate-related funding opportunities. Institutional expansion 
is widespread in global governance, where international bureaucracies commonly 
show ‘mission creep’ by engaging in ‘a significant amount of activities into new pol-
icy areas’ (Littoz-Monnet 2017: 584). In the case of climate change, this can be seen 
in international organizations (Maertens 2021), among non-state actors (de Moor 
2020; Dupuits 2020; Morena 2020), and among professionals in a specific policy 
domain such as military affairs (Estève 2020; Jayaram 2020). This drive towards 
institutional expansion motivates practices aimed at benefiting from the symbolic 
and material capital conferred by UN climate summits and climate-related activities 
(e.g. adaptation programs delivered by IOs, advocacy work by NGOs, media atten-
tion, etc.), including attempts to refract issues through a climate lens in order to enter 
climate arenas. As climate change moves up the international agenda, it has come to 
exert an increasing force of attraction for actors seeking to attract funds, gain rec-
ognition, or reap other benefits (Dupuits 2020; Jayaram 2020; Maertens 2021). In 
return, by expanding their field of action to cover climate change, these actors drive 
climatization processes, potentially through alternative framing strategies—such as 
riskification and securitization (Estève 2020).
(5) Domains affected by climatization exhibit a climate logic in the making
Domains, issues, and objects affected by climatization often come to exhibit a 
set of common features as climate frames, experts, or policy instruments become 
dominant. As in the cases of securitization and judicialization, the homogenizing 
force of climatization processes can be described as a ‘climate logic’ imposed upon 
the climatized domain. The concept of a ‘logic’ refers to situations where ‘actors, 
institutions or an entire policy field rely upon a specific way of reasoning, function-
ing and ordering things’ (Louis and Maertens 2021: 14). But as the transformation 
of climate change into a distinct policy domain is a recent one, the study of climate 
logic is more exploratory than in the abovementioned cases. The practices, actors, 
and institutions that compose the field of climate politics are still comparatively het-
erogeneous, than, for instance, in the security field. We thus focus on drawing the 
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contours of a climate logic in the making. Building on the contributions to this issue 
and on previous work,3 we identify a set of four features that characterize the emer-
gent ‘climate logic’. To reflect its emergent and unstable nature, we also identify 
observable and plausible variations within each of these characteristics. These are 
presented in the form of continua (see Table 2). We hope that future work will build 
on, further specify, and possibly extend these features, and track the progressive sta-
bilization of the emerging climate logic along each of these continua.
First, climate logic is scientized. Climatization leads to an emphasis on scien-
tific tools and framings, and tends to foreground expert discourses. Climate debates 
heavily draw on results obtained through numerical modelling, from general circu-
lation models that estimate warming impacts to integrated assessment models that 
simulate future scenarios and evaluate mitigation strategies (Edwards 2010). Highly 
complex modelling tools have thereby become an obligatory passage point when 
introducing new issues or forms of expertise into global climate governance (Dahan 
2010). As a result, climate discourses frequently adopt a ‘view from nowhere’ (Borie 
et al. 2021) that depoliticizes climate conflicts, for example when risk management 
tools are applied to assess the likelihood of political and social unrest  in climate 
hotspots (Estève 2020; Maertens 2021). However, we also find instances where the 
introduction of new actors into climate arenas leads to a pluralization of ways of 
knowing, as when indigenous peoples emphasize the necessity of considering local 
and traditional knowledge in mitigation and adaptation strategies (Dupuits 2020).
Second, climate logic takes a planetary perspective. Climatization favours a radi-
cally global point of view on natural and social phenomena and their interactions. 
This ‘global gaze’ (Litfin 1999; Fogel 2004) rests on the observation that the climate 
system is inextricably interconnected at a planetary scale. With this interconnect-
edness comes a need for political cooperation: because carbon dioxide emissions 
do not stop at national borders, the climate issue is said to require a multilateral 
response. Actors in climatized domains therefore have to formulate their issues 
in planetary terms and connect them to Earth system processes. In doing so they 
Table 2  A climate logic in the making
Characteristic Continuum
Scientized View from nowhere ⇔ Plural ways of knowing
Planetary perspective Global gaze ⇔ Alternative globalities
Long-term temporality Strategic planning ⇔ Participatory futuring
Solution-oriented Carbon reductionism ⇔ Social transformations
3 See, for instance, previous studies on the climatization of security practices (Oels 2012) and soil sci-
ences (Kon Kam King et al. 2018). Closer to our categorization, Methmann (2010) identifies four discur-
sive pillars of what he terms the ‘global governmentality of climate protection’: globalism, scientism, an 
ethics of growth, and efficiency. While we broadly agree on the first two characteristics, we depart from 
this framework on the latter two, by subsuming growth and efficiency under a new category (solution-
oriented) and by adding a temporal dimension.
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must adopt a paradoxical understanding of universality: in the face of the climate 
challenge, we are all in the same boat, even as some regions and populations are 
much more affected than others. While climate logic always involves a global refer-
ence point, such a planetary perspective falls on a continuum between the top-down 
approaches of global governance and Earth system management (Aykut et al. 2020), 
and the construction of alternative globalities in social movements and transnational 
actor networks (de Moor 2020; Dupuits 2020).
Third, climate logic introduces a long-term temporality into public debates, 
policy processes and administrative routines. Climate research and climate debates 
build on different long-term temporalities, such as the century-long horizons of 
equilibrium change and slow feedback cycles in Earth system processes and the 
multidecadal perspectives of decarbonization scenarios that form the political hori-
zons of global climate governance national low-carbon transformations (Aykut et al. 
2020). Politically, climatization thus tends to favour a return of the plan, the sce-
nario and the long-term strategy in public administration and governance. However, 
in some places the rise of climate concerns has also been instrumental to the rise of 
alternative ‘techniques of futuring’ based on participatory and deliberative methods 
(Hajer and Pelzer 2018).
Fourth, climate logic is solution-oriented. Climate governance debates fre-
quently place value on market- and technical fixes over problem-centred or justice 
frames. Actors who wish to enter climate governance arenas therefore often feel 
compelled to foreground possible solutions and adopt a pragmatic,  ‘positive’ dis-
course. The capacity to propose technical and managerial fixes, market-based instru-
ments, or institutional reforms trumps calls for radical economic or political changes 
(Swyngedouw 2010). This is particularly salient in post-Paris climate governance, 
where the ritualized invocation of the ‘Paris spirit’ in high-profile meetings, the stag-
ing of best practices and corporate success stories, serve to sustain the positive nar-
rative of an ongoing transition to a decarbonized world economy (Aykut et al. 2020; 
Morena 2020).  The focus on solutions thereby favours a ‘carbon reductionism’ 
(Méndez 2020) that firmly protects the status quo of a profoundly unequal global 
political economy (Jayaram 2020; Maertens 2021; Morena 2020). More recently 
however, calls for climate justice and debates on deep decarbonization have been 
instrumental in foregrounding  societal transformations that have the potential to 
challenge existing power structures (de Moor 2020; Jayaram 2020; Maertens 2021).
Importantly, arguing that the emergent climate logic varies along these four 
dimensions does not mean that the outcome of climatization processes is entirely 
open. We do discern some general tendencies within each of the dimensions. For 
example, while there are ongoing struggles around the recognition of plural ways of 
knowing in climate debates, model-based approaches and scientized framings are 
generally favoured (Foyer and Dumoulin 2017). While a planetary perspective can 
accommodate polycentric and bottom-up ways of organizing, it tends to invisibilize 
local contexts and struggles in debates on climate futures. And while climate logic 
is not necessarily ‘post-political’ per se (Swyngedouw and Wilson 2014), climatiza-
tion frequently results in a focus on incremental solutions and techno-fixes that con-
form to a growth-oriented liberal world order. With regard to temporality, the picture 
is perhaps less clear, as the long-term perspective brought by climate concerns often 
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contrasts with the short-term logics of contemporary capitalism and project-based 
governance (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999). It also sits uneasily with the urgency 
frequently invoked by activists and experts alike to characterize the climate crisis. 
Climate logic may therefore also foreground a different temporal register: a routi-
nized invocation of urgency (Louis and Maertens 2021), in which it is always ‘five 
minutes to midnight’ (Geden 2018)… but never too late.
(6) Climatization reveals, reproduces, and rearticulates power relations
After this exploration of the motives and modes of climatization, we now look 
into the consequences of these transformations. We find that climatization reveals, 
reproduces, and rearticulates power relations. We know from other comparable 
cases of expanding and overlapping social spheres that these involve power strug-
gles over the jurisdiction of social actors, logics, and practices of different fields. 
Hence, judicialization processes operate through an extension of the influence of 
judicial language and practice; securitization processes through the adoption of 
exceptional measures, the use of discourses of discrimination, and the extension of 
executive powers; and medicalization confers legitimacy upon health professionals 
and medical interventions into the medicalized field. Accordingly, the articles in this 
issue show that climatization tends to increase the sphere of influence of actors from 
the climate arena—climate scientists, climate policymakers, climate activists, (often 
self-proclaimed) climate victims, etc. At the same time, new actors enter climate 
arenas, and engage in struggles for recognition and influence. The question we pose 
here is therefore less about the effectiveness of climatization in terms of climate 
governance or carbon reductions, but rather about the ways in which climatizing 
moves unveil and affect global power dynamics. This means considering climatiza-
tion not as a disincarnated dynamic, but as a social process in which actors advance 
their framings, build coalitions for specific solutions, or extend their sphere of action 
and legitimacy. Climatization thus becomes a useful lens to examine shifting power 
relations in global governance. The articles in this issue suggest three distinct ways 
to assess the outcomes and identify the winners and losers of climatization.
First, climatization reproduces and rearticulates power relations. Strategic clima-
tizing moves can help powerful actors maintain their domination by incorporating 
and instrumentalizing climate change. U.S. philanthropic foundations mainstream 
their preferred political views (Morena 2020), armed forces expand their legitimacy 
to act on non-security issues including socio-ecological problems (Estève 2020; 
Jayaram 2020), and powerful states use climate change to demonstrate and consoli-
date their important role in multilateral fora (Maertens 2021). However, climatiza-
tion also rearticulates power dynamics by expanding some actors’ field of action 
and influence: not only climate experts, but also less powerful states and civil soci-
ety. While grassroot movements seek to gain a legitimate voice during the COPs 
by climatizing their causes (Dupuits 2020), developing states that are vulnerable 
to warming impacts may use the political capital they acquire in the climate arena 
in other international venues. This is the case, for example, of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, the smallest state to secure a seat on the UN Security Council (Mae-
rtens 2021; see also the case of Bangladesh’s ‘weak power’ in climate negotiations, 
Baillat 2018).
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Second, climatization shifts political responsibilities in time and in space. Cli-
matization unfolds through the attribution and recognition of political responsibil-
ity not only in causing, but also in solving the climate crisis (Maertens  2021). It 
brings a long-term perspective to both discussions of historical responsibility and 
debates on present policymaking. This can produce frictions, as when the long-term 
objectives of global climate governance and their translation into net-zero pledges 
target 2050 instead of near-term action (Aykut et al. 2020). Climatization can also 
displace local and national responsibilities by focusing attention on the global level, 
and erase alternative, situated framings in the name of a common planetary problem 
(de Moor 2020). Inevitably, such dynamics depend on the actors driving the clima-
tization process. They also reveal a broader underlying tension between the politici-
zation of climate change, through climatizing moves, and its depoliticization, when 
responsibility is diluted among numerous actors—if everyone is responsible, no one 
is (Louis and Maertens 2021).
Third, climatization accommodates dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. It is 
enacted through and works to justify the involvement of new actors (scientists, con-
sultants, etc.) and the deployment of new approaches (scientized, globalized, etc.). 
For instance, debates on the security implications of climate change have opened the 
doors of the UN Security Council to the UN Environment Programme, the World 
Meteorological Organization, and think tanks specialized in climate security (Mae-
rtens 2021). Attempts to reform global climate governance and extend its reach have 
invited a broader participation of non-state actors in international regulation (Aykut 
et al. 2020). Yet the recognition of such dynamics of inclusion should not obscure 
processes of exclusion, especially when the preference for a specific approach—sci-
ence-based, market-oriented, etc.—marginalizes other understandings of the climate 
crisis (Dupuits 2020; de Moor 2020). Climatization may well challenge established 
hierarchies by setting new priorities (e.g. when the ‘climate emergency’ is framed 
as the most important global problem), disrupt established routines in many settings 
and organizations, and empower new actors and their issues and solutions. Never-
theless, in most cases the emerging climate logic does not unsettle existing power 
relations or the core objectives of hegemonic actors.
Concluding remarks: climatization and the transformation of global 
governance
Climate change increasingly appears as the paradigmatic environmental problem of 
our times, and as one of the most pressing crises affecting global society. It dom-
inates international discussions on the protection of the environment and beyond, 
imposing new framings on other (global) problems. Through climatization, new 
subjectivities emerge in the everyday (Paterson and Stripple 2010) as much as in 
global politics (Death 2011). But, as in comparable processes of financialization and 
judicialization, different degrees or intensities of climatization can be observed. Cli-
matization may be seen both in small incremental changes and in deeper societal 
transformations. Each of the case studies assembled in this special issue helps to 
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delineate, characterize, and assess the contours of this social process and the extent 
of the changes it causes.
However, climatization is by no means the only macro-transformation affecting 
global society. It coincides or overlaps with, and is at times reinforced or moderated 
by, other social dynamics, which may in their turn reframe climate policy through 
the lens of another policy area or social sphere (e.g. by securitizing or financial-
izing it). Further research is needed to obtain a more fine-grained understanding 
of such encounters, when two fields overlap or expand into each other’s territory. 
Does one field and its logic typically dominate over the other? Under what condi-
tions can we observe forms of hybridization wherein the framing, actors, and sug-
gested policy action of separate policy domains merge? The outcome of climatizing 
moves is not always a clear power shift through the expansion of one domain over 
the other. Ongoing transformations can reinforce each other—as has been the case 
for the scientization of public policy, intensified through the rise of environmental 
issues (Beck 1986). Such evolutions might become more salient in the future, as 
climate policy instruments become increasingly financialized, or the management of 
climate impacts securitized. As more and more issues are framed as global problems 
deserving global action (Neveu and Surdez 2020), future research on the transforma-
tions of global governance should pay close attention to these processes, wherein 
actors compete to impose the logics of their respective domains on other domains. 
This also raises the question of the intermediaries of climatization, which we did not 
foreground here. What can be said about the actors that promote climatization, and 
notably about their sociopolitical backgrounds, interests and forms of organization? 
How are their strategies, and the outcomes of their climatizing moves, related to 
their positionalities within global politics?
Another avenue for future research concerns the outcomes of climatization pro-
cesses, both in terms of equity and climate justice, and in catalyzing effective cli-
mate action. Our findings indicate that such outcomes vary across empirical cases. 
A positive contribution of climatization to climate governance can therefore not be 
presupposed. Climatizing moves can be largely symbolic and promote incremen-
tal solutions; they often foreground techno-fixes, but may also provide visibility to 
more transformative strategies of societal change. However, if we take seriously the 
transversality and complexity of the climate problem, some degree of climatization 
is almost certainly inevitable for a (more) effective treatment of the problem. Con-
versely, climatization often ushers new themes and issues into global, national, and 
subnational climate governance arenas. This may in turn lead to a need to establish 
new subsidiary or parallel governance processes, and thereby increase the complex-
ity of policymaking and global governance.
As global warming progresses and efforts to mitigate and adapt intensify, living 
under a changing climate—or in a ‘new climate regime’ (Latour 2015)—increas-
ingly appears as a central feature of ‘our’ new, and highly unequal, human condition 
in the Anthropocene. In other words, we firmly believe that climatization is here to 
stay. It is thus crucial to better understand this process, recognizing its problems 
and ambiguities, but also examining its transformative potential and identifying the 
conditions under which such potentials can be harnessed with a view to building a 
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more effective and equitable climate politics. We think that the contributions in this 
special issue contribute to this endeavour.
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